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INTRODUCTION

A recent press account summarizing research on the question of
who benefits from economic development tax subsidies began:
At its best, the federal New Markets Tax Credit program has
subsidized projects like a community-owned grocery store in West
Oakland. Or a new permanent home for an immigrant rights
organization in Queens, New York. Or the re-purposing of a 180acre former steel production site on the far South Side of Chicago
into spaces for retail, green manufacturing and food production, and
the largest indoor recreational space in the region. At its worst, the
same program has subsidized high-priced condominiums or even
convention centers that spark or accelerate gentrification.1

Unpacked, the paragraph contends that economic development
subsidies, when well-spent, fund amenities that do not lead to
gentrification.
The paragraph, however, makes a number of

*

Clinical Professor of Law, Yale Law School. Thank you to the Fordham Urban Law
Journal for this symposium, particularly Cristina Lombardi for organizing the
symposium and Shazell Archer and Stephen Rutman for their work on this Essay,
and to Nathan Cummings for providing able research assistance.
1. Oscar Perry Abello, Who Benefits from the New Markets Tax Credit? New
Research Dives into 5,000 Projects to Find Out, NEXT CITY (May 4, 2021),
https://nextcity.org/daily/entry/who-benefits-from-the-new-markets-tax-credit
[https://perma.cc/RKZ3-H2FZ].
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assumptions about what sorts of subsidized transactions might yield
gentrification: Community-owned retail does not lead to
gentrification and high-priced condominiums do. Consider, however,
the preferences of potential gentrifiers, well-paid, college-educated
people living in or near low-income neighborhoods. Many readers of
the quoted article, in fact, are probably potential gentrifiers. And, as
they read this list of subsidized deals, it seems likely that many of
them thought to themselves, “I would love to live in a neighborhood
with a community-owned grocery store.” A community-owned
grocery store — where presumably there had previously been no
grocery store — would make many potential gentrifiers more likely to
move to that former food desert. Similarly, an indoor recreational
space sounds like an attractive amenity for families of all income
bands.
But neighborhoods with convention centers are not generally
considered particularly attractive. And the empirical research is quite
clear that even “high-priced condominiums” do not raise nearby rents
and they sometimes help to stabilize or decrease them.2 That is not
surprising: Developers like to build their “high-priced
condominiums” where rents are already rising; they do not typically
look to roll the dice in low-rent neighborhoods with no preexisting
upward rent trajectory.3
In other words, the lede understood the conventionally accepted
truth — high-end condominiums are a sign of gentrification — but
misunderstood the causation. And perhaps it also misunderstood
whether the tax credits that subsidized these transactions actually
caused the transaction to occur, a question we need to take especially
seriously in the context of Opportunity Zones, the cousin of the New
Markets Tax Credit that was the subject of this symposium.
Whether Opportunity Zones cause or facilitate gentrification is a
difficult question in part because it is far from clear that Opportunity
Zones have a “but for” causal impact at all. Do Opportunity Zones
drive investment decisions, or are they frosting on the top of an
already-tasty cake? Some tax credit programs — for example, the
more lucrative version of the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit —
provide sufficiently deep subsidies to render an unprofitable

2. Xiaodi Li, Do New Housing Units in Your Backyard Raise Your Rents?,
FANNIE MAE 1 (June 13, 2020), https://www.fanniemae.com/media/35821/display
[https://perma.cc/3VH2-3Z7U].
3. Id. at 50.
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transaction profitable.4 A rental housing complex with capped,
below-market rents is not a profitable transaction. Add in 9% LowIncome Housing Tax Credits and, lo and behold, it is.
Other credits provide a shallower subsidy that nonetheless can be
leveraged to draw private investment that might not otherwise have
occurred. Consider, for example, the New Markets Tax Credit. It is
shallower than the 9% Low-Income Housing Tax Credit, but the
Internal Revenue Service has endorsed a leveraged loan model that
makes it possible for a tax credit-motivated investor to pursue deals,
the profitability of which turn on the tax credits.5 Opportunity Zones,
however, are a shallow subsidy. The subsidy is insufficiently large to
make unprofitable deals profitable, though it will make some
profitable deals marginally more attractive to investors.6
Whether Opportunity Zones cause gentrification, then, is two
inquiries, at least, baked into one. What, if anything, are the effects
of Opportunity Zones? And do those effects cause gentrification? In
other words, do Opportunity Zones cause the things that cause
gentrification? This Essay unpacks these two questions in the reverse
order. Part I explores the policies and conditions that lead to
gentrification. Part II then examines the impact of the Opportunity

4. Roger M. Groves, The De-Gentrification of New Markets Tax Credits, 8 FLA.
TAX REV. 214, 218 (2007).
5. The leveraged loan model effectively multiplies the effect of the credit by
permitting the amount of credit to be calculated based, in part, on loan proceeds. The
lender receives only interest and principal. The tax credits are paid to the equity
investor, even though the amount of credit is based, in significant part, on the amount
of the loan. “The [New Markets Tax Credit] is only equal to 39% of the equity
investment made into the CDE — no investor would be satisfied with an investment
of $1 that results in a return of only $0.39 . . . . The leverage model combines equity
from a tax credit investor with the leverage loan proceeds . . . . The transaction is
structured so that the leverage lender gets a return similar to its normal commercial
lending activities — interest and principal and the tax credit investor gets what it is
usually seeking — tax credits and some amount of cash return.” New Markets Tax
Credit
Basics,
HOLLAND
&
KNIGHT
LLP,
http://services.housingonline.com/nhra_images/NMTC%20Basics.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6A9M-VGQX] (last visited Aug. 25, 2021).
6. BRETT THEODOS ET AL., URB. INST., AN EARLY ASSESSMENT OF
OPPORTUNITY ZONES FOR EQUITABLE DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS 21 (2020),
https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/102348/early-assessment-ofopportunity-zones-for-equitable-development-projects.pdf [https://perma.cc/7LQLQPC6]. Urban Institute researchers spoke to investors who quantified the value of
Opportunity Zone tax benefits as “adding somewhere between 150 to 300 basis
points to the return for most deals.” Id. The interviewees concluded that “for a
typical project, the incentive is not enough to provide the return that investors seek.”
Id. One fund manager told the researchers, “you will hardly see the OZ incentive
turning a project with a 5-to-8 percent return from a ‘no’ to a ‘yes,’ but it may happen
with a project with a 10 percent return.” Id.
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Zone program. Part III and the Conclusion argue that place-based
economic development subsidies, like Opportunity Zones, are
attractive to policymakers but unlikely to result in poverty alleviation.
Advocates and scholars committed to addressing the problems facing
low-income places will have to look elsewhere for solutions.
I. WHAT CAUSES GENTRIFICATION?

The vast majority of low-income census tracts in the United States
are not at risk of gentrifying.7 Instead, in an era of escalating wealth
inequality, segregation, and regional economic disparities, most lowincome places are only likely to see ever-increasing rates of poverty.8
Nevertheless, considering this question — what causes gentrification
— can be helpful to probing broader questions about place-based
subsidies and the impacts of those subsidies on low-income people.
Researchers studying gentrification have endeavored to identify
what kinds of investments trigger displacement and have
distinguished between “amenity effects” of development and “supply
effects.”9
Adding housing supply has “supply effects.”10 By
absorbing a portion of demand, adding supply can decrease the rate
at which rents rise.11 If the effect is large enough or demand is
relatively weak, it can even stabilize or decrease rents.12 Developing
housing, therefore, can mitigate escalating housing prices, a key
component of gentrification.

7. By some accounts, as many as 20% of gentrification-eligible (i.e., low-income)
census tracts gentrified in recent decades. See Miriam Zuk et al., Gentrification,
Displacement, and the Role of Public Investment, 33 J. PLAN. LITERATURE 31, 33
(2018). Others, however, find even less impact across the nation. See ALAN
MALLACH, THE DIVIDED CITY: POVERTY AND PROSPERITY IN URBAN AMERICA 123–
44 (2018).
8. Zuk et al., supra note 7, at 33.
9. SHANE PHILLIPS, MICHAEL MANVILLE & MICHAEL LENS, UCLA LEWIS CTR.
FOR REG’L POL’Y STUD., THE EFFECT OF MARKET RATE DEVELOPMENT ON
NEIGHBORHOOD RENTS 7–14 (2021), https://www.lewis.ucla.edu/research/marketrate-development-impacts/ [https://perma.cc/EXU9-79TQ] (citing and explaining
several such studies).
10. See, e.g., Vicki Been, Ingrid Gould Ellen & Katherine O’Regan, Supply
Skepticism: Housing Supply and Affordability, N.Y.U. FURMAN CTR. 4 (Aug 20,
2018),
https://furmancenter.org/files/Supply_Skepticism_-_Final.pdf
[https://perma.cc/QV6X-RNSZ] (describing how restricting the supply of houses
increases housing prices).
11. See PHILLIPS ET AL., supra note 9, at 4.
12. Brian J. Asquith, Evan Mast & Davin Reed, Supply Shock Versus Demand
Shock: The Local Effects of New Housing in Low-Income Areas 16 (Upjohn Inst. for
Emp. Rsch., Working Paper No. 19-316, 2019).
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Developments that add amenities are different. New amenities can
make a neighborhood attractive to people who might not have
otherwise considered living there. Joking about gentrification, people
will often point to amenities like wine bars, beer gardens, and organic
groceries as signs of gentrification. These amenities might be
indicators that gentrification is taking place.13 It is unclear, however,
that they drive gentrification. Other amenities are likely more
important to an individual’s decision on where to live. Indeed, the
more basic amenities to which low-income people are entitled are the
same amenities that might attract middle- and high-income people to
low-income neighborhoods.
Returning to the earlier example, grocery stores are a fundamental
need that all people share. Low-income neighborhoods are often
food deserts.14 They lack adequate access to reasonably priced
groceries. For that reason, community development corporations,
nonprofit organizations, funders, and others seek to advance policy
and transactions that can bring grocery stores to low-income
neighborhoods.15
These grocery stores, then, also make a
neighborhood more livable for wealthier households that would not
have otherwise considered living in a neighborhood without a grocery
store. Making a place more livable — nicer parks; more retail, fullservice grocery stores; safer streets; transportation infrastructure;
proximity to jobs — makes it more attractive to middle-class and
wealthy people whose ability to pay for housing will outpace that of
existing residents. Even when programs like New Markets Tax

13. See Neil Reid, Do Craft Breweries Gentrify Neighborhoods? It’s
Complicated, SALON (Jan. 13, 2020, 1:00 PM), https://www.salon.com/2020/01/13/arecraft-breweries-a-harbinger-of-gentrification-its-complicated/
[https://perma.cc/UNC9-FMN6] (summarizing the author’s own research to conclude
that “in most cases, craft breweries are not the catalyst for neighborhood
revitalization or gentrification. Rather, they typically follow other investments”).
14. See Kelly M. Bower et al., The Intersection of Neighborhood Racial

Segregation, Poverty, and Urbanicity and Its Impact on Food Store Availability in
the
United
States,
58
PREVENTIVE
MED.
33
(2014),
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3970577/
[https://perma.cc/7GLXJNGR] (“As neighborhood poverty increased, supermarket availability decreased
and grocery and convenience stores increased, regardless of race/ethnicity. At equal
levels of poverty, black census tracts had the fewest supermarkets, white tracts had
the most, and integrated tracts were intermediate.”).
15. WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE COMMUNITY ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT MOVEMENT:
LAW, BUSINESS, AND THE NEW SOCIAL POLICY 105 (2001); see also Food Deserts in
the United States, ANNIE E. CASEY FOUND. (Feb. 13, 2021),
https://www.aecf.org/blog/exploring-americas-food-deserts [https://perma.cc/4G4UBD43] (a blog post from a foundation that funds interventions intended to benefit
low-income families).
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Credits are designed to provide those amenities, they are not
designed to ensure that those amenities are enjoyed by low-income
people. The solution, of course, is not to avoid building a grocery
store but instead to build sufficient housing and sufficient affordable
housing to ensure that the grocery store benefits low-income
residents.
Gentrification, then, is not solely a function of what is built. It is, in
addition and perhaps even more importantly, a function of who gets
to enjoy whatever is built. Where a disinvested community is
successfully revitalized, “[i]ncumbent residents stay and reap the
benefits of neighborhood improvements, whereas in gentrification
they can be displaced as the social and economic environment of
neighborhoods shift, and the public sector does not take action to
protect long-term residents.”16 As a result of such displacement,
investments intended to benefit a neighborhood’s low-income
residents may instead benefit wealthier people who are newly
attracted to that community once those investments are made.
Even if the tax benefits of Opportunity Zones were limited to uses
perceived to increase quality of life or create jobs in job-poor areas,
there would be nothing in the program that would require that those
uses or jobs be made available to low-income people. In the case of
jobs tied to tax credit and other subsidy programs, studies have found
these jobs are not created so much as they are redistributed around a
region.17 Moreover, jobs are not necessarily made available to
residents of adjacent low-income neighborhoods but instead hire
applicants from around the commuting region, including higherincome areas.18
In fact, even when subsidies or public dollars are used to build
public goods, there may be no good mechanisms to ensure that those
goods are enjoyed by people who might need them most. As a result,
some scholars and observers have worried that improvements to
public transit, for example, can drive gentrification and

16. Zuk et al., supra note 7, at 3.
17. Timothy Bartik, Targeting Jobs Toward People Who Need Them, 39 J. POL’Y
ANALYSIS & MGMT. 854, 855 (2020) (“Therefore, when we create jobs in a distressed
neighborhood, we are mostly moving jobs around within the metro area.”).
18. See id. (“This doesn’t help neighborhood residents much, because there is
sufficient commuting within a metro area that overall labor demand in the metro area
matters more than where the jobs are located within the metro area.”). Bartik says,
further that, “[i]f the job creation is accompanied by improved neighborhood
amenities . . . then this might encourage gentrification.” Id.
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displacement.19 Car ownership is expensive and universal car usage
wreaks havoc on quality of life and the environment.20 Public transit
infrastructure is a key policy intervention to ensure economic vitality,
access to opportunity, and quality of life. But there are few transitrich neighborhoods in the United States, even in our most
economically vital regions, and adding reasonably frequent, reliable
transit to a neighborhood that lacks it will increase that
neighborhood’s attractiveness to everyone, including people with
higher incomes than the people who already reside in that
neighborhood. Most reasonable people can agree that transit is a
sensible use of public dollars and that low-income people, for whom
access to a car would require spending a greater portion of their
wealth and income, might disproportionately benefit from transit
expenditures. Again, this certainly does not mean that society should
stop investing in amenities, whether grocery stores or public transit.
And yet, it is not possible to ensure that the benefit of investment
flows primarily to low-income residents of a neighborhood in which
transit improvements are made. Investments in amenities must be
accompanied by additions to housing supply, particularly affordable
housing supply.
Meanwhile, the ability of people with money to look elsewhere —
to move to a newly desirable neighborhood — dampens the efficacy
of using place-based subsidies to improve the lives of poor people.
Existing place-based subsidies, other than subsidized, incomerestricted affordable housing, have not built in a model for ensuring
that the amenities built with those subsidies are enjoyed by lowincome people. The inability to solve that puzzle presents a strong
argument for cash payments to poor people themselves rather than
the indirect approach taken by programs like Opportunity Zones. In
census tracts susceptible to displacement, it is not so simple, then, to
say, well, the statute ought to define what uses are subsidized by an
Opportunity Zones-eligible investment. The same amenities that are
desirable to low-income people will attract higher-income people.
The point here is not to stop investing in public goods but to
encourage policymakers to permit housing construction alongside
19. See, e.g., Jeff Turrentine, When Public Transportation Leads to
Gentrification,
NAT’L
RES.
DEF.
COUNCIL
(June
1,
2018),
https://www.nrdc.org/onearth/when-public-transportation-leads-gentrification
[https://perma.cc/V4YG-8D7D] (describing “transit-induced gentrification”); see also
JEREMY R. LEVINE, CONSTRUCTING COMMUNITY: URBAN GOVERNANCE,
DEVELOPMENT, AND INEQUALITY IN BOSTON 134–36 (2021).
20. Gregory H. Shill, Should Law Subsidize Driving?, 95 N.Y.U. L. REV. 498, 500–
02 (2020).
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new amenities and to supplement public subsidies targeted at lowincome places with subsidies intended to benefit low-income people.
II. WHAT DO OPPORTUNITY ZONES CAUSE?

Opportunity Zones will cause gentrification only insofar as they
bring about gentrification-causing transactions that would not
otherwise have occurred had it not been for the Opportunity Zone
subsidy. The program famously does not require investments to fund
developments that will be attractive to low-income people. There are
essentially no limitations on what can be built.21 Not surprisingly
then, some critical accounts suggest that Opportunity Zone-funded
projects are precisely the disamenities, such as self-storage facilities
and warehouses, one expects to see, without any public subsidy, in
low-income neighborhoods.22 These uses do not provide substantial
numbers of jobs, and the jobs that are created do not pay particularly
well.23 Nor do these uses otherwise increase local quality of life.
There is some evidence, from press accounts and the like, that
Opportunity Zone investments have been made in the types of
developments one would have expected to occur with or without the
investment: Self-storage facilities in slow or no-growth regions24 and
high rent mixed-use developments in growing regions.25

21. The regulations prohibit the use of Opportunity Zone investment funds to
develop golf courses, country clubs, massage parlors, racetracks, tanning facilities,
and liquor stores. 26 C.F.R. § 1.1400Z2(d)-1 (2021).
22. See Jesse Drucker & Eric Lipton, How a Trump Tax Break to Help Poor
Communities Became a Windfall for the Rich, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 27, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/31/business/tax-opportunity-zones.html
[https://perma.cc/2P8X-SH84].
23. Heather Long, Amazon’s $15 Minimum Wage Doesn’t End Debate over
Whether It’s Creating Good Jobs, WASH. POST (Oct. 5, 2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/amazons-15-minimum-wagedoesnt-end-debate-over-whether-its-creating-good-jobs/2018/10/05/b1da23a0-c80211e8-9b1c-a90f1daae309_story.html [https://perma.cc/C44H-BDMJ] (“Amazon’s pay
is significantly above the $10.28 an hour that the typical retail worker makes, but it’s
less than the $15.53 that a median warehouse employee is paid, according to Labor
Department data.”).
24. See, e.g., Tom Condon, Can Opportunity Zones Revive Struggling
Neighborhoods?, CONN. MIRROR (Dec. 14, 2020), https://ctmirror.org/2020/12/14/canopportunity-zones-revive-struggling-neighborhoods/ [https://perma.cc/97VX-XKSH];
Jennifer Nagorka, Opinion, Opportunity Zone Tax Breaks Shouldn’t Go to Another
Self-Storage Facility in a Low-Income Neighborhood, DALL. MORNING NEWS (Feb.
23,
2020,
2:00
AM),
https://www.dallasnews.com/opinion/commentary/2020/02/23/opportunity-zone-taxbreaks-shouldnt-go-to-another-self-storage-facility-in-a-low-income-neighborhood/
[https://perma.cc/R6TS-XWDD]. A Google search will lead would-be investors to a
number of Opportunity Zone-augmented invitations to invest in self-storage
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With that said, the inability to thoroughly track Opportunity Zone
investments makes it quite difficult to understand their effect. There
is no database of Opportunity Zone transactions. Notably, the
original standalone Investing in Opportunity Act contained more
robust reporting requirements, but these were removed prior to the
passage of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act.26 Among other things, these
reporting requirements would have eventually included annual
reports that disclosed Opportunity Zone investments at the national
and state level; the number and value of Opportunity Funds; the
percentage of Opportunity Zones that received investments; and an
assessment of Opportunity Zone investment outcomes including job
creation, poverty alleviation, and business creation.27 A bipartisan
group of lawmakers subsequently introduced a bill to reintroduce the
reporting requirements from the original bill and mandate that
certain information about Opportunity Zone investments be made
publicly available,28 but this bill has never been voted out of
committee. As a result, while some in Congress have sought to add
reporting requirements that would allow policymakers and others to
track Opportunity Zone transactions, to date these efforts have been
unsuccessful.29 Given the absence of an exhaustive repository of
Opportunity Zone transactions,30 we might instead look to experience
from the New Markets Tax Credit for some sense of the impact
Opportunity Zone investments might have. New Markets Tax
Credits, it should be noted, differ programmatically from Opportunity
facilities. See, e.g., Evelyn Josza, Self Storage and Investing in Opportunity Zones
During
COVID-19,
COM.
PROP.
EXEC.
(Oct.
6,
2020),
https://www.commercialsearch.com/news/self-storage-the-perks-of-investing-inopportunity-zones-during-a-pandemic/ [https://perma.cc/G9NC-R55X].
25. Drucker & Lipton, supra note 22.
26. Susan W. Gates & Ann B. Schnare, Can Opportunity Zones Live Up to Their
Promise?, WHARTON POL’Y GRP. 10 (2020), https://whartonpolicy.com/wpcontent/uploads/2020/12/UPDATED-Report_OpportunityZones_12_2_20_FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/FE7H-CJDS].
27. S. 293, 115th Cong. § 1400Z-2(c) (2017); see also Press Release, U.S. Sen.
Cory Booker, Booker, Scott, Hassan, Young Introduce Bipartisan Bill to Strengthen
Reporting Requirements for Opportunity Zone Tax Incentive (May 8, 2019),
https://www.booker.senate.gov/news/press/booker-scott-hassan-young-introducebipartisan-bill-to-strengthen-reporting-requirements-for-opportunity-zone-taxincentive [https://perma.cc/8V2G-KRTQ].
28. S. 1344, 116th Cong. § 3 (2019).
29. Id. Consider, for example, the Opportunity Zone Reporting and Reform Act,
S. 2787, 116th Cong. (2019), a bill introduced by Senator Ron Wyden on November 6,
2019, and the Opportunity Zone Transparency and Accountability Act, H.R. 5011,
116th Cong. (2019), a bill introduced by Representative Ron Kind on November 8,
2019.
30. S. 1344.
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Zones in a number of ways. First, the subsidy is deeper and,
therefore, has greater potential to render feasible an investment
otherwise unlikely to occur. Second, investment funds seeking to use
New Markets Tax Credits must apply for a limited pot of credits. The
application process is selective and the historic rate of success is less
than 25%.31 In order to be successful, applications must identify a
realistic pipeline of actionable investments. Third, New Markets
applicants must establish and consult with an advisory or governing
board representative of the low-income communities in which the
funds seek to invest.32 Importantly, the New Markets Tax Credit
program includes some of the kinds of guardrails anti-gentrification
advocates might seek to impose on the Opportunity Zone program.33
While the New Markets Tax Credit program includes some of the
guardrails that Opportunity Zones critics seek to incorporate in the
Opportunity Zone program, the programmatic differences between
New Markets Tax Credits and Opportunity Zones have not
necessarily addressed the link between certain kinds of place-based
investment subsidies and poverty alleviation. A 2008 review of the
New Markets Tax Credit’s early funding from 2002 to 2006 found that
the credit had been used to subsidize nearly $2 billion in investment
in what the author deemed “Problematic Purposed Projects,”
including commercial office buildings, performing arts centers, and
upscale retail outlets.34
New Markets Tax Credits have been deployed to fund a wide
variety of projects, ranging from community-focused initiatives like
childcare programs and social service centers to market-rate ventures
such as chain stores and hotels.35 The plurality of transactions,
however, have funded commercial real estate projects.36 Just under

31. NEW MKTS. TAX CREDIT COAL., NEW MARKETS TAX CREDIT PROGRESS
REPORT 22 (2018), https://nmtccoalition.org//wp-content/uploads/2018-NMTCProgress-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/VT3A-JVEZ].
32. I.R.C. § 45D(c)(1).
33. See, e.g., Edward W. De Barbieri, Opportunism Zones, 39 YALE L. & POL’Y
REV. 82, 96 (2020) (arguing in favor of additional use restrictions, reporting
requirements, and participation opportunities in the Opportunity Zone program).
34. Groves, supra note 4, at 225–26.
35. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-10-334, NEW MARKETS TAX
CREDIT: THE CREDIT HELPS FUND A VARIETY OF PROJECTS IN LOW-INCOME
COMMUNITIES,
BUT
COULD
BE
SIMPLIFIED
33–34
(2010),
https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-10-334.pdf [https://perma.cc/J8UG-2MMQ] (listing
examples of different CDE project types).
36. MARTIN D. ABRAVANEL ET AL., URB. INST., NEW MARKETS TAX CREDIT
(NMTC)
PROGRAM
EVALUATION:
FINAL
REPORT
126–27
(2013),
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half of these projects have been office, retail, mixed-use, or hotel
projects.37
A report by the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco also found
that most New Markets Tax Credit investments, approximately 66%,
through 2006 were used to fund commercial real estate.38 The
report’s author noted that real estate projects are viewed as less risky
and more easily combinable with other tax subsidies, and suggested
that the program be restructured to provide greater incentives for
investments in business operations given their potentially greater
benefit to residents of low-income communities.39 A 2010 report by
the Government Accountability Office, assessing New Markets Tax
Credit-funded projects from 2003 to 2009, found that the minority of
funds structured as nonprofit organizations, in contrast, were more
likely to use the New Markets Tax Credit to fund business operations
rather than commercial real estate developments.40
It is not entirely clear if these commercial real estate projects are
significantly owned by or informed by the needs of residents of lowincome areas. In fact, the 2013 Urban Institute study found that
“[c]ommunity involvement and emphasis on producing community
benefits was uneven across early-year [New Markets Tax Credit]
projects.”41 Based on an informal survey of project stakeholders, the
study found that local public agencies were involved with fewer than
half of the early-year projects before financing was arranged and that
— notwithstanding the program’s representative advisory board
requirement, discussed above — only 55% of projects reported
having any discussions with community stakeholders (for example,
CDCs and public development agencies) during the development
process.42

https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/24211/412958-New-Markets-TaxCredit-NMTC-Program-Evaluation.PDF [https://perma.cc/G5CB-7FLU].
37. Id. at vii. The study’s analysis combined CDFI data collected from the
universe of 2,031 projects funded in the program’s first four rounds of allocations
with randomly sampled survey and interview information from this group. Id. at 24.
38. Lauren Lambie-Hanson, Addressing the Prevalence of Real Estate
Investments in the New Markets Tax Credit Program 6 (Fed. Rsrv. Bank of S.F.,
Working Paper No. 2008-04, 2008).
39. Id. at 29, 34.
40. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-10-334, supra note 35, at 13.
41. ABRAVANEL ET AL., supra note 36, at x.
42. Id. at 67.
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The program has also been criticized for failing to adequately
support minority investors and minority-owned businesses.43 The
2013 Urban Institute study found that 13% of businesses funded were
minority-owned, and 10% were women-owned or controlled.44 A
2009 Government Accountability Office report found that minority
status is associated with a lower probability of receiving a New
Markets Tax Credit allocation.45
Not surprisingly, empirical findings on the New Market Tax
Credit’s effects more generally have been mixed. The credits have
been associated with modest positive economic outcomes. For
example, the credit has been found to have had small but positive
impact rates on the entry of supermarkets in low-income
communities.46 One study found that New Markets Tax Credits were
modestly successful in attracting new business to low-income
communities but failed to drive capital to existing businesses.47 The
credit has also been linked to some indicators of gentrification, such
as increased housing turnover rates, but not to others, such as
increased housing prices. 48 The credit has also been found to
changed local industry composition to favor more capital-intensive
business types like manufacturing over more service-intensive ones.49
43. See Janet Thompson Jackson, Can Free Enterprise Cure Urban Ills?: Lost
Opportunities for Business Development in Urban, Low-Income Communities
Through the New Markets Tax Credit Program, 37 U. MEM. L. REV. 659, 663 (2007).
44. ABRAVANEL ET AL., supra note 36, at 63.
45. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-09-536, NEW MARKETS TAX
CREDIT: MINORITY ENTITIES ARE LESS SUCCESSFUL IN OBTAINING AWARDS THAN
NON-MINORITY ENTITIES 23 (2009), https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-09-536.pdf
[https://perma.cc/68SQ-35PS].
46. See, e.g., Matthew Freedman & Annemarie Kuhns, Supply-Side Subsidies to

Improve Food Access and Dietary Outcomes: Evidence from the New Markets Tax
Credit, 55 URB. STUD. 3234 (2018).
47. AMANDA ROSS & KAITLYN WOLF, DO MARKET-BASED TAX INCENTIVES
ATTRACT NEW BUSINESSES? EVIDENCE FROM THE NEW MARKETS TAX CREDIT 20–21
(2014),
https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/124360/1/ERSA2014_00653.pdf
[https://perma.cc/58RF-2LH2]. This paper was presented at the 54th Congress of the
European Regional Science Association in St. Petersburg.
48. See Matthew Freedman, Teaching New Markets Old Tricks: The Effects of
Subsidized Investment on Low-Income Neighborhoods, 96 J. PUB. ECON. 1000 (2012)
(comparing census data from 2000 with community survey data from 2005 to 2009
and finding that the New Markets Tax Credit was associated with modest reductions
in the poverty and unemployment rates in affected communities, but also with a slight
increase in household turnover rates. The study found no association between the
New Markets Tax Credit and changes in housing prices, and very little positive
spillover of these investments from LICs to surrounding neighborhoods).
49. ROSS & WOLF, supra note 47, at 21–22; see also Kaitlyn Harger & Amanda
Ross, Do Capital Tax Incentives Attract New Businesses? Evidence Across
Industries from the New Markets Tax Credit, 56 J. REG. SCI. 733, 751 (2016) (finding
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Notably, over half of the jobs created as a result of New Market Tax
Credit investments are temporary construction jobs,50 and only a third
of total jobs go to neighborhood residents.51
In short, in connection with a deeper, more targeted subsidy with
guardrails, scholars have found modest, temporary successes. There
is little reason to think that a shallower, less targeted subsidy —
Opportunity Zones — will have substantially different outcomes.
The available empirical data suggests that place-based subsidies like
the New Markets Tax Credit and Opportunity Zones have largely
been used to drive commercial investment without a significant focus
on the needs of low-income people. This kind of investment is
unlikely to create the kinds of amenity effects that drive gentrification
in a supply-constrained housing market, but it is also unlikely to
produce robust, long-term positive impacts on either individual
families or low-income neighborhoods.
III. LESSONS

Tax subsidies like Opportunity Zones are advertised as
encouraging private investment in low-income places in a way that
benefits low-income people. Our national experience with New
Markets Tax Credits calls into question whether that advertising is
truthful. And Opportunity Zones pose a variation on this question
that occurred to very few people in the context of New Markets Tax
Credits (or predecessor place-based subsidies like Enterprise and
Empowerment Zones) a generation ago: Can investment subsidies do
more harm than good by causing gentrification and involuntary
displacement? The question is a difficult one in part because it is
difficult to track the effects of these subsidies at all — as recounted in
the literature review above, where there are impacts, they are
generally on the margins and do not seem to lead to robust, long-term
benefits to either individual families or neighborhoods.
Why, then, are place-based investment subsidies so attractive to
policymakers? Despite scant evidence of impact on poor people’s
lives and substantial evidence of inefficiency, place-based economic
development subsidies not only survive but multiply over time.
Individual programs come and sometimes go, but the underlying
drive to provide subsidies to investments geographically located in

positive effects on retail and manufacturing firms but negative effects on wholesale,
FIRE, transportation, and services).
50. ABRAVANEL ET AL., supra note 36, at xiv.
51. Id.
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low-income places remains. This Part explores the motivations
driving place-based economic development subsidies.
For politicians and policymakers working on this issue, there is an
acute understanding of the role of neighborhood institutions and local
government as service providers. The local government is not often
recognized as a service provider. But, of course, providing services —
education, clean streets, clean water, parks, community programming,
public safety — is its primary function. And in low-income
communities, starved for tax dollars because, by definition, residents
are poor and property is cheap, there is simply not enough money to
pay for those services. Because poverty is concentrated, poorer
localities are forced to provide services to a disproportionately
resource-deprived population using a disproportionately small tax
base. Programs like Opportunity Zones may provide a way of
addressing this problem by attracting taxable real estate and
transactions.
The notion that local and state actors use programs like
Opportunity Zones to maximize property tax revenues is consistent
with the finding that Opportunity Zone designations were largely
technocratic.52 Importantly, then, the discourse surrounding placebased policy must recognize that the policies are sometimes intended
to do just that: Benefit the place. In doing so, they ensure a political
coalition consisting of legislators representing low-income places and
legislators motivated to provide tax benefits to businesses and
investors. These programs benefit the place by providing additional
tax revenue to cash-starved cities and towns. In effect, these
programs trade federal capital gains tax revenues for local property
and sales tax revenues. The ultimate goal might be for the local
government to have more money to spend on schools and trash pickup. But the policy is directed at place for a reason, and people-based
and place-based policies are not easily interchangeable for that
reason. People are mobile — indeed, helping them helps the tax base,
but only temporarily.
Unfortunately, low-income places’ disproportionately small tax
bases are massive structural problems, and simply subsidizing small
amounts of private activity will not ameliorate the issue. Effectively
addressing these issues requires action at higher levels of governance
and intense focus on neighborhood-level activity risks missing the
forest for the trees, missing the stranglehold placed on low-income

52. James Alm, Trey Dronyk-Trosper & Sean Larkin, In the Land of OZ:

Designating Opportunity Zones, 188 PUB. CHOICE 503 (2020).
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neighborhoods by wealthy suburbs, state capitols, and racial
segregation.
But, partly because policymakers and politicians understand the
fiscal constraints under which low-income places operate, place-based
policies, particularly when structured as private market incentives,
are, as many have noted, bipartisan. While bipartisanship does not
necessarily result in good legislation, it may at least ensure that some
legislation is passed, and place-based tax incentives, from Enterprise
Zones to New Markets Tax Credits to Opportunity Zones, have been
part of the community development conversation for at least 40 years
now. They are not the most effective way to address local fiscal
disparities. While there is, perhaps, no conceptual problem with
trading federal capital gains tax revenues for local property tax
revenues, there is no evidence that the government is getting a dollarfor-dollar trade.53
But scholars and advocates worried about poverty must engage the
question of whether that is a worthy objective. The key inquiry of
that engagement ought to center on the connection between helping a
place and helping low-income people. It is unassailably true that, for
example, Newark’s ability to provide local goods and services affects
the lives of people who live in Newark, but the increased property tax
revenue to low-income places as a result of Opportunity Zones will be
relatively small, and it will be greatest in the places where investment
would have come anyway. Federal help directed at Newark should be
sufficiently tailored and sufficiently substantial such that it helps lowincome people who live in Newark, whether now or in the future.
Is it possible to design a program that is both politically attractive
for all the reasons place-based subsidies have proliferated over the
years and effective at addressing poverty? What kinds of changes
might narrow the scope of Opportunity Zone investments to projects
that will benefit low-income people?
One approach might be to impose on Opportunity Zones the types
of governance required by the New Markets Tax Credit program.
That program requires that low-income residents of eligible census
tracts be part of the group making investment decisions. It also
requires that tax credit recipients have a mission of service to lowincome communities. Similarly, Community Housing Development
Organizations (CHDOs) receive priority in certain funding

53. Certainly, the subsidies themselves are not designed to ensure a dollar-fordollar trade, though they could easily be so reformed if the political will to do so
existed.
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allocations and, in order to be certified as a CHDO, an organization’s
governing board must include residents of low-income communities.54
The accountability measures built into the New Markets and CHDO
programs, which require that a subsidy-receiving entity reserve a
certain number of board or advisory board seats for people residing in
certain low-income census tracts,55 can look like a form of
tokenization. Tokenization blurs the possibility that low-income
people and residents of low-income neighborhoods might disagree as
to what sorts of amenities and businesses would benefit other lowincome people.56
Instead, one might consider reconfiguring subsidy eligibility to
piggyback on certain local decisions, such as the decision to provide a
local subsidy or other support, essentially subjecting Opportunity
Zone eligibility to the local democratic process.57 While local
elections are hardly perfectly democratic,58 if the concern is ensuring
that subsidized developments represent the priorities of a
neighborhood’s residents, the democratic process is likely to be more
indicative of those priorities than is the presence of a few token board
members, representing, in any event, the minority of a board’s makeup. Relying on the existing democratic process might seem clumsy,
but there are efficient mechanisms that would not require additional
processes to gauge democratic support for a project. For example,
consider the more generous availability of 4% Low-Income Housing
Tax Credits where at least 50% of an affordable housing development
or rehabilitation is funded by tax-exempt private activity bonds

54. 24 C.F.R. § 92.2 (2021).
55. See id.
56. On the hazards of assuming that all members of low-income communities
share the same vision and preferences for local economic development projects, see
LEVINE, supra note 19. Levine, in an ethnography of community development
corporations and their funders, notes frequent “farcical claims of ‘community
consensus.’” Id. at 203.
57. In the context of housing development, whether that housing is low-income or
affordable, requiring projects to provide evidence of local support is a recipe for a
fair housing disaster. See Rev. Rul. 2016-29, 2016-52 I.R.B. 875. While the effect
might be less pronounced in the context of commercial developments, policymakers
nevertheless need to worry about the possible problems with tying federal and state
subsidies to local decision-making.
58. See, e.g., Zoltan L. Hajnal, Opinion, Why Does No One Vote in Local
Elections?,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Oct.
22,
2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/22/opinion/why-does-no-one-vote-in-localelections.html [https://perma.cc/4GU4-WHTD].
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which, in turn, must be authorized by a unit of local or state
government.59
More importantly, however, this thought exercise — considering
what kinds of development the democratic process might yield and
how they compare to what Opportunity Zone investors are likely to
provide — relates back to a core point missing from the design of a
program like Opportunity Zones. Too many low-income people live
in neighborhoods that are starved for capital. These neighborhoods
are underinvested. But capital and investment are not ends unto
themselves. The question the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act refuses to ask is,
capital for what? If the investments missing in a low-income
neighborhood are well-funded schools, public parks, clean air, and
affordable transit, then the private market simply is not going to
provide those things, no matter what the tax incentive is. You cannot
design a program that can subsidize the production of what are,
fundamentally, public goods that must be provided by the
government. And as is relevant to inquiries about gentrification, in a
world in which public parks and adequate transit are scarce, providing
those amenities in neighborhoods where housing is scarce is likely to
make those neighborhoods newly attractive to potential gentrifiers.
Community development practitioners are practical people and
because there is no cap on Opportunity Zone subsidies, they have
not, for the most part, focused on the program’s deficiencies. Even if
most of the program’s money goes to projects that would have
happened anyway — projects with little to no benefit for low-income
people — some of the money could go to good projects. It is possible
that Opportunity Zone money will provide one additional necessary
layer of financing for some projects that will improve the lives of
residents of low-income communities. But this is a far cry from the
kind of fundamental change that the program is advertised to
produce, and the kinds of capital that might benefit the low-income
people who largely reside in low-income communities.
CONCLUSION: OPPORTUNITY RECONSIDERED

Given the name of the program, one might think Opportunity
Zones are crafted to create opportunity. They are not, of course. But

59. See JOE BIBER, CORP. FOR SUPPORTIVE HOUS., FINANCING SUPPORTIVE
HOUSING WITH TAX-EXEMPT BONDS AND 4% LOW-INCOME HOUSING TAX CREDITS 3
(2007),
https://www.csh.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/Report_financingwithbondsand-litch_1012.pdf [https://perma.cc/8A4B-CYVA] (“To qualify for an
allocation of 4% Low-income Housing Tax Credits, 50% or more of the project’s
development costs must be funded by bonds during construction.”).
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it is worth noting that the word “opportunity” has independent
meaning in community development and fair housing discourse and
policy-making. From Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority60 to
the Department of Housing and Urban Development’s Moving to
Opportunity for Fair Housing program61 to contemporary work on
identifying the factors that give rise to intergenerational economic
mobility,62 the very word “opportunity” has long been a guiding star
in conversations about anti-poverty policy and community
development. Economist Raj Chetty and colleagues have used deep
troves of census and other data to try to understand the place-based
factors and conditions that create economic opportunity.63 They have
sought to understand what resources affect the likelihood that a child
born into poverty will have upward mobility.64 In a world of equal
opportunity, low-income children would be just as likely as middleclass children to grow up to be middle-class adults. That is simply not
the case in the United States today.65 Among African American
families, in particular, poverty is an intergenerational phenomenon,
the result of accumulated disadvantage, not sporadic episodes of bad
luck.66 That accumulated disadvantage is, in part, the result of underresourced, segregated communities.67
Notably, the resources Chetty and his co-authors identify already
exist — in well-off places. As a result, he argues in favor of policies
and programs that enable low-income people to move to wellresourced neighborhoods, in addition to policies and programs that
bring resources to concentrated neighborhoods of low-income

60. 304 F. Supp. 736 (N.D. Ill. 1969) (finding that the Chicago Housing Authority
violated African Americans’ constitutional right under the Fourteenth Amendment
to equal protection under the law for building public housing units only in
predominately African-American communities).
61. See Moving to Opportunity for Fair Housing, U.S. DEP’T HOUS. & URB. DEV.,
https://www.hud.gov/programdescription/mto [https://perma.cc/H62W-V7PM] (last
visited Aug. 27, 2021).
62. See, e.g., DANIEL P. MCMURRER, MARK CONDON & ISABEL V. SAWHILL, URB.
INST., INTERGENERATIONAL MOBILITY IN THE UNITED STATES (1997),
https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/70426/406796-intergenerationalmobility-in-the-united-states.pdf [https://perma.cc/G4U6-WLTN].
63. See, e.g., Raj Chetty et al., The Opportunity Atlas: Mapping the Childhood
Roots of Social Mobility (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 25147,
2018),
https://opportunityinsights.org/paper/the-opportunity-atlas/
[https://perma.cc/XK8S-THVD].
64. See id.
65. See PATRICK SHARKEY, STUCK IN PLACE: URBAN NEIGHBORHOODS AND THE
END OF PROGRESS TOWARD RACIAL EQUALITY 35–37 (2013).
66. Id. at 45–46.
67. Id. at 28.
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people.68 There are inherent benefits to an integrationist approach
because integration is, according to Chetty and his co-authors, one of
the defining characteristics of places that promote economic
opportunity.69 Integration creates a kind of interest alignment that
ensures that when well-off people with political power advocate for
public goods that benefit themselves, they are simultaneously
advancing the interests of low-income people who live in their
neighborhoods.70 In segregated places, on the other hand, well-off,
politically powerful parents, for example, can advocate for wellresourced schools that serve only the children of well-off, politically
powerful parents.71
In addition to supporting policies and programs that decrease
barriers to integration, opportunity data and research supports efforts
to bring opportunity-enhancing infrastructure to under-resourced
neighborhoods. In other words, research points to certain types of
infrastructure that, in turn, set the stage for intergenerational
economic mobility. For example, in Charlotte, North Carolina,
Opportunity Insights is working with local actors to “[i]ncreas[e]
access to high-quality preschool, ensur[e] students have skilled
teachers and sufficient educational supports, and provid[e] adequate
healthcare” in order to increase opportunity.72 Opportunity Insights
began working with Charlotte in part because that city, despite
enjoying a long-term regional economic boom, “had the lowest rate of
upward mobility of the largest 50 metropolitan areas in the

68. See, e.g., Raj Chetty et al., Race and Economic Opportunity in the United
States: An Intergenerational Perspective, 135 Q.J. ECON. 711, 718 (2020)
(“[R]educing the black-white income gap will require policies whose effects cross
neighborhood and class lines and increase intergenerational mobility specifically for
black men.”).
69. Raj Chetty et al., Where Is the Land of Opportunity? The Geography of
Intergenerational Mobility in the United States, 129 Q.J. ECON. 1553, 1557 (2014)
(“We then identify five factors that are strongly correlated with the variation in
upward mobility across areas. The first is segregation: Areas that are more
residentially segregated by race and income have lower levels of mobility. Second,
areas with more inequality as measured by Gini coefficients have less mobility . . . .”).
70. See Anika Singh Lemar, Building Bridges and Breaking Down Walls:
Taking Integration Seriously in CED Practice, 28 J. AFFORDABLE HOUS. &
CMTY . DEV . L. 207, 211 (2019).
71. See generally RUCKER C. JOHNSON, CHILDREN OF THE DREAM: WHY SCHOOL
INTEGRATION WORKS (2019).
72. Supporting Local Community: Charlotte Opportunity Initiative Collaboration
with Community Leaders to Identify and Support Data-Driven Systems Change,
OPPORTUNITY
INSIGHTS,
https://opportunityinsights.org/charlotte/
[https://perma.cc/R3FZ-YN9T] (last visited Aug. 7, 2021).
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country.”73 In other words, the normal indicators of economic success
in a place did not translate into increased opportunity and well-being
for low-income residents of that place, a fact that calls into doubt so
many of the assumptions that drive place-based subsidies.
One might imagine a place-based subsidy that prioritizes
opportunity-enhancing infrastructure.
Such a program, unlike
Opportunity Zones or New Markets Tax Credits, would identify,
based on research, the infrastructure necessary to create opportunity.
The program would then subsidize the production of only that
infrastructure. The difficulty, here, is that the sorts of infrastructure
that create mobility and opportunity are not private goods — like
apartment buildings, self-storage facilities, and even highemployment manufacturing facilities — but, instead, public goods.
But, generally, Opportunity Zones represent more of the same, a
relatively small-scale effort to attract private capital to places where
public capital is lacking. That private capital cannot and will not build
public goods. And the complexity required to participate in the
program will ensure well-compensated employment for accountants
and lawyers, but not for residents of low-income communities. They
may do no harm, but they are also unlikely to do much good.
Doing good will require us to look elsewhere. Doing good will
require investing in the public goods that create opportunity. Doing
good will require building enough housing to allow more people to
live in opportunity-rich places. And doing good will require opening
the doors for all people — regardless of income, race, or class — to
enjoy the public resources that already exist.

73. Id.

